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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20020821-CA 
JOSHUA JOHN EARL, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of possession of 
clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b), in the Third Judicial District Court, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Sheila K. McCleve, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred 
upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). See Addendum A 
(Judgment and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence 
seized after an illegal warrantless entry of his house in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment? 
Standard of Review: "We review the factual findings underlying the trial court's 
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous 
standard. However, we review the trial court's conclusions of law based on these findings 
'for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the 
legal standard to the facts.'" State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, Tf9, 999 P.2d 7 (quotation and 
citation omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Joshua John Earl's challenge to the constitutionality of the search and 
seizure is preserved on the record for appeal ("R.") at 33-39 and 56-67. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment, is determinative of the issue 
on appeal. It provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Earl was charged by Information with one count of possession of clandestine 
laboratory precursors and/or equipment, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b) (1953 as amended); one count of purchase, transfer, 
possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(b) (1953 as amended); and unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37a-5 (1953 as amended). R.4-7. An arrest warrant issued. R.l. 
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Earl moved to suppress evidence that was seized during a search of a house in 
which he was temporarily residing. R.53-54. He filed two written motions. R.33-39,56-
66. The State filed one written motion. R.40-51. An evidentiary hearing on the motion 
was held. R.278. The trial court denied Earl's motion. R.73-74. It provided written 
findings and conclusions of law in its order. R. 127-33 (Addendum B). 
Earl entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). R.233. The State amended the Information to one count of 
possession of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b); the remaining counts 
were dismissed along with a sentencing enhancement. Id,; R.4-7. Earl pled guilty to that 
single charge. R.233. Earl was duly sentenced to prison. R.260-61. A timely notice of 
appeal was filed. R.262-63. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following evidence was testified to at a suppression hearing: 
Sheila Gledhill ("Gledhill") rented a house she owned, located at 34 West 2700 
South, to her son Jeremy Allen ("Allen")- R.278[8]. Allen agreed to pay $350 rent per 
month. R.278[9]. In lieu of rent, Allen was supposed to maintain the yard and keep the 
inside of the house clean. R.278[9-10]. Allen was behind on the rent and had failed to 
keep up the house properly. R.278[9]. Consequently, Gledhill decided to evict her son. 
R.278[8]. 
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Gledhill testified that a clerk at a nearby convenience store informed her that a 
skinhead named Marvin was living with Allen at the house. R.278[ 10,23]. Gledhill also 
heard a rumor that Marvin was running a meth lab there. R.278[ 11 ]. Gledhill had not 
given permission for a second person to live in the house. R.278[10]. 
Gledhill called the police from her cell phone from a business next door to the 
house. R.278[ 11 ]. She wanted the police to accompany her to the house because she 
was fearful of the possible second tenant. R.278[ 10]. 
Officer Dean Brimley ("Brimley") of the South Salt Lake Police Department 
responded. R.278[ 11,26]. Gledhill walked with Brimley to the front door and unlocked 
it with her own key. R.278[13]. Gledhill testified that she did not give Brimley consent 
to search the house. R.278[21]. 
Brimley testified that he accompanied Gledhill to the residence to keep the peace 
while she evicted Allen. R.278[26]. Brimley was uniformed and armed, although his 
weapons (gun, baton, and spray) were not drawn. R.278[28]. Gledhill told him that 
Allen had a drug problem with methamphetamine and marijuana. R.278[26]. She also 
reported the rumors of a meth lab at the house. Id However, Brimley did not 
independently investigate Gledhilfs claims prior to entering the house. R.278[38]. 
After Gledhill opened the front door with her key, she and Brimley went inside. 
R.278[ 14,27]. The front door led immediately into the living room. R.278[14]. Brimley 
and Gledhill saw four men in the kitchen area. R.278[27]. Allen and Earl sat in the 
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kitchen in front of a computer. R.278[14]. A man Gledhill did not recognize was also at 
the computer. IdL Brimley did not recognize any of the men. R.278[29]. The men were 
behaving in an orderly, non-threatening manner. R.278[41]. 
Earl testified that he was living with Allen temporarily since he was kicked out of 
his aunt's house. R.278[58]. He kept his clothes at the house and helped out with the 
chores and groceries. R.278[61]. Allen and Earl are stepbrothers and friends. 
R.278[ 19,58]. According to Gledhill, Earl did not have permission to be at the house. 
R.278[18]. Earl did not inform the officers that he lived there, and none of the officers 
asked. R278[59]. 
Brimley observed items that he associated with meth labs and paraphernalia, 
including bottles which were later confirmed to hold iodine, several little bottles lined up 
in a row by a couch, many boxes of pseudoephedrine by the couch, and a bong-type 
instrument on the coffee table. R.278[29]. Gledhill testified that she observed a glass 
pipe on the coffee table. R.278[14]. 
Brimley ordered the men into the living room to get them away from sharp 
objects. R.278[31]. Brimley did not get a search warrant. R.278[39]. He decided to 
frisk the men on account of his safety concerns since he was outnumbered, he could not 
see their hands when they were in the kitchen, he observed the drug paraphernalia, and 
had information from Gledhill about a possible criminal activity. R.278[30-31,39]. 
Brimley noted that the men did not display any threatening actions. R.278[41]. 
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Brimley asked for everyone's identification. R.278[30]. All of the men except 
Earl produced i.d.. Id Earl said he did not have any i.d., but provided the name Justin 
Ganon. Id Brimley also asked each man if he had weapons. R.278[32]. Earl replied 
that he did, and he, along with the others, was frisked. Id Earl did not consent to the 
frisk. R.278[40]. He did not object, however, since he felt that he had no choice in the 
matter. R.278[59]. Brimley held Earl's hands behind him while he conducted the frisk. 
R.278[32]. Brimley located a sheathed knife concealed in Earl's pants under his shirt. 
Id. He also found a four-inch pocket knife in Earl's pocket. R.32. He then located Earl's 
wallet. R.278[33]. Earl let him retrieve it. Id Without permission from Earl, Brimley 
looked inside the wallet and found Earl's identification. R.278[33,44]. 
Brimley cuffed Earl and placed him under arrest for the concealed weapon and 
providing false information. R.278[33]. He told Earl to sit on the couch. Id Allen 
signed a consent form allowing the officers to search the house. R.278[35]. The consent 
was limited to property that was under his control. R.278[42]. Brimley testified that 
Gledhill gave verbal consent as well. Id. However, he acknowledged that Gledhill did 
not live at the house so the only consent could come from Allen since he actually resided 
there. R.278[43]. 
Brimley searched a backpack belonging to Earl that was sitting on the floor next 
to the couch. R.278[36]. According to Brimley, Allen told Brimley the backpack 
belonged to Earl after it was searched. Id Brimley also testified that court documents in 
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the backpack were subsequently linked to Earl. Id The backpack contained two iodine 
bottles identical to the bottles observed on the floor, scales, a how-to book on 
methamphetamine, and red phosphorous. R.278[36,49]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence seized in violation of Earl's 
Fourth Amendment right against warrantless search and seizure. See U.S. CONST, 
amend. IV; UT. CONST, art. I, § 14. Earl has standing to challenge the search since he 
was a temporary resident of the rental house at the time of the search. See Minnesota v. 
Olson. 495 U.S. 91 (1990); State v. Kent. 432 P.2d 64 (Utah 1967). 
Although the officer was granted consent to enter the house by the landlord, State 
and Federal law hold that landlords do not have actual authority to grant consent to 
search. See Chapman v. United States. 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Kent 432 P.2d 64. 
Moreover, the officer did not have a reasonable belief in the landlord's apparent authority 
to consent since he knew she did not live at the house. See Illinois v. Rodriguez. 497 
U.S. 177 (1990); State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The illegal entry renders all evidence subsequently seized inadmissible. See 
Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The evidence seized in plain view is 
inadmissible since the initial entry was unlawful. See State v. Gallegos. 967 P.2d 973 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). Moreover, the illegal entry taints the consent subsequently given 
by Earl's roommate, Allen. See United States v. Maez. 872 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1989); 
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State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). In any event. Allen's consent does not 
authorize the search of Earl's backpack since it was expressly limited to Allen's 
belongings alone, and the officer did not have a reasonable belief otherwise and did not 
make a further inquiry to discern the pack's owner as required by the Fourth Amendment. 
See United States v. Matlock. 415 U.S. 164 (1974): Rodriguez. 497 U.S. 177. 
The illegal entry further taints the search incident to Earl's arrest for presenting 
false identification. The illegal entry factor differentiates this case from standard 
searches incident to lawful arrest where there is no prior illegal police misconduct. See 
Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Given this added concern under the Fourth 
Amendment, a more rigorous analysis of the reasonableness of the officer's search under 
the totality of the circumstances is appropriate. See Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
Viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, the officer exploited the illegal entry 
to arrest Earl and search the backpack. Moreover, the evidence does not suggest that the 
officer had a genuine fear that Earl would access a weapon or evidence considering that 
he did not search the backpack immediately after Earl's arrest. 
As a final matter, there were no exigent circumstances that might otherwise justify 
the search. See Chapman. 365 U.S. 610. In fact, the evidence establishes that the officer 
had ample opportunity to secure a warrant but failed to do so. Id, Under the 
circumstances of the case, his failure to do so does not comport with the Fourth 
Amendment's reasonableness standard. See Terry. 392 U.S.I. 
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ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT. 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right of 
individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures except upon the issuance 
of a warrant by a neutral magistrate. See U.S. CONST, amend. IV; see also UT. CONST. 
art. I, § 14. 
No warrant was obtained before the police entered the house of Allen and his 
temporary house guest Earl. R.278[30,39]. In certain, limited circumstances, plain view, 
consent and a search incident to arrest are exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
However, as discussed herein, none of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement apply in this case and the evidence seized is inadmissible. 
A. Fourth Amendment Protections Extend to Earl as a Resident of the 
Rented House. 
The trial court made a clearly erroneous factual finding that Earl was not a 
resident of the house for purposes of standing under the Fourth Amendment. R.129. As 
discussed below, the undisputed facts of this case establish that he was in fact a resident 
who stayed at the house. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990) (holding 
that overnight guest in house enjoyed Fourth Amendment protections). Yet, even if he 
was only a social visitor at the house, he would still have standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to challenge the search and seizure of his belongings at the house. See State 
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v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730. 735 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (revM on other grounds. 850 P.2d 427 
(Utah 1992)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "leased and rented premises [] come 
under the protection of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Kent, 432 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 
1967) (footnote with citations omitted). The house at issue was rented by Allen from his 
mother, Sheila Gledhill. R.278[8]. Gledhill was the landlord, while Allen was the 
tenant. According to Gledhill, Allen lived in the house and was responsible for 
maintaining the yard and the inside. R.278[9]. Allen paid her $350 per month for rent 
and/or did house and yard work in exchange for the right to live at the house. IdL 
Earl was a temporary resident of the house, which means the Fourth Amendment 
protections extended to him as well. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 96-97 (1990) (holding that 
overnight guest in house enjoyed Fourth Amendment protections). The test for standing 
depends upon whether "the person who claims the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment 
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S.128, 143 (1978). "A subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is 'one that 
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Olson, 495 at 95-96 (quoting Katz v. 
United States. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
In light of these guidelines, the U.S. Supreme Court in Olson held that an 
overnight guest in a house enjoys Fourth Amendment protections. Id., at 96-97. The 
Court reasoned that society values the custom of allowing a guest to stay in one's home. 
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Id. at 98. The Court also noted the particular vulnerability of the overnight guest, who is 
removed from his own house and must temporarily rely on the protection and security of 
another's. Id. at 99. Recognizing that the Fourth Amendment "'protects people, not 
places/'' id at 96 n.5 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351), the Court concluded that an 
overnight guest has legitimate expectations of privacy in his or her host's home "not 
inconsistent with" the host's "ultimate control of the house/' IdL at 99 
This Court similarly recognized the Fourth Amendment rights of house guests of 
virtually any duration in State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on 
other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992) (holding that failure of affidavit to list grounds 
for requesting nighttime search authority did not implicate defendant's fundamental 
rights so as to require suppression). This Court noted that there is "no talismanic 
significance, in determining standing, to the length of time a social guest is in the home." 
Id. at 735 (citing Olson, 495 U.S. 91). Hence, although the defendant was not an 
overnight guest, she had standing to challenge the search of her purse. Id. 
Earl had a greater status as a temporary resident of the house than an overnight 
guest or social visitor, and consequently enjoys even greater protections under the Fourth 
Amendment than the defendants in Olson and Rowe. Earl testified that he was Allen's 
step-brother, living with Allen because he was kicked out of his aunt's house and until he 
found a place of his own. R.278[58]. He kept his clothes in a closet in the house and 
helped clean and bought groceries to contribute to the household. R.278[61]. The State 
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did not present any evidence to the contrary. See generally R.278. 
To this extent the house was Earl's "dwelling place" and his "place of retreat and 
security" at the time of the entry and search. Kent, 432 P.2d at 69 (footnote and citation 
omitted). It is the exact sort of protected living arrangement, albeit temporary, that falls 
under the sweep of the ruling in Olson, which recognized legitimate privacy rights when 
one stays at another's house while w4in between . . . homes" or during a visit with a 
relative. See 495 U.S. at 98. Yet, under Rowe, even if Earl was only visiting Allen at 
the house, he would still have a legitimate expectation of privacy recognized by society 
as valid for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See 806 P.2d at 735. Consequently, 
Earl has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search and seizure of his 
belongings which occurred at the house while he was there. Olson, 495 U.S. at 96 
(quotation omitted); see also Rowe, 806 P.2d at 735. 
Although the findings do not suggest otherwise, Earl had standing to challenge 
the search of his backpack inside the house even if he was not residing or staying there. 
The uncontroverted evidence presented at the suppression hearing establishes that the 
backpack belonged to Earl alone, and no-one else had access to it or authority to use it. 
See generally 278. "A defendant 'who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property 
will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy.'" State v. Caver, 814 P.2d 
604, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 
(1978)). Since Earl owned the backpack, he has standing to challenge its search as well. 
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See State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 783 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (defendant had standing 
to challenge search of diaper bag to which he had access). 
B. Gledhill Did Not Have Actual or Apparent Authority to Consent to the 
Entry and Search of the House. 
The trial court made a clearly erroneous factual finding that Gledhill consented to 
a search of the house. R.129. Her own testimony directly refutes that finding. Although 
Gledhill asked the police to accompany her into the house to protect her, R.278[ 13]. she 
expressly testified that she did not consent to the search. R.278[21].1 Regardless, 
Gledhill did not have the authority, actual or apparent, to consent to either an entry or 
search of the house. 
i. Gledhill as a Landlord. Did Not Have Actual Authority to Consent and 
Otherwise Lacked Common Authority over the House for Most Purposes to 
Provide Valid Consent. 
The trial court made an incorrect legal finding that Gledhill could consent to entry 
of the house since she had a "right to enter the property to inspect it." R.130. Contrary 
to the trial court's order, Gledhill did not have the authority as a landlord to give consent 
1
 The colloquy at the hearing is as follows: 
Defense Counsel: Of course, you asked the officers to accompany you to 
the house. Ms. Gledhill, did you ever give the officers permission to search 
the house? 
Gledhill: No, I did not. 
R.278[21]. 
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to enter or search the house. R.130. 
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have expressly rejected the 
proposition that a landlord has actual authority to consent based on her property rights. 
See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (search of a tenant's premises 
pursuant to a landlord's consent was illegal under the Fourth Amendment); Stoner v. 
California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (hote 1 front desk clerk could not give valid consent 
to search the room rented by the defendant); State v. Kent, 432 P.2d 64, 65, 68-69 (Utah 
1967) (motel manager could not consent to police use of "a hidden vantage point from 
which [the police] could keep Kent under surveillance"). 
Chapman, Stoner and Kent all have at their core the principle that is critical to an 
analysis of this issue: tenants possess a right to be secure in their places of privacy and 
seclusion which exists notwithstanding a landlord's property interest. Authority to 
consent is "not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the 
property." United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1974). The privacy right is a 
function of a person's right of occupancy in a place and "control [over the property] for 
most purposes," not common law property interests. Id, '"It is the right of possession 
rather than the right of ownership which ordinarily determines who may consent to a 
police search of a particular place.'" State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) 
(quoting 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5(b) (2d ed. 1987)). 
In Chapman, the landlord walked up to the tenant's house to invite him to church. 
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See 365 U.S. at 611. He noted an "'odor of mash' about the house" and called the police. 
Id. The landlord told the officers to go in a window to see what was going on. IcL at 
612. The officers did so and observed a ''sizable distillery and 1,300 gallons of mash." 
Id. Chapman arrived at the house shortly thereafter and was arrested. IcL The officers 
had neither an arrest nor a search warrant. Id. 
In holding the search unconstitutional, the Supreme Court rejected common law 
principles that allow landlords to enter rented premises to do such things as '"view 
waste,'" noting that "'it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding 
the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle 
distinctions, developed and refined by the common law.'" Id at 617 (quotation omitted). 
"[T]o uphold such an entry, search and seizure 'without a warrant would reduce the 
(Fourth) Amendment to a nullity and leave (tenants') homes secure only in the discretion 
of (landlords).'" Id (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). The 
Court also reasoned that the police did not enter Chapman's house to view waste, but to 
investigate a suspected illegal distillery, which took the search out of the legitimate scope 
of landlord access even if it were to provide a justifiable basis for the entry and search. 
Id. at 616.2 
2
 The Chapman Court also relied on the fact that the police had an opportunity to 
get a search warrant prior to entering the house in ruling that the search was 
unreasonable. See 365 U.S. at 614. The relevance of that aspect of the Chapman 
holding to the present case is discussed infra point I.Civ.. 
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In Stoner. the police followed a lead on a burglary investigation to a hotel where 
the defendant was staying. See 376 U.S. at 484. The defendant was not in his room, so 
the police asked the desk clerk if they could go into the room to make an arrest. Id, at 
485. The clerk agreed and opened the room with a key. Id The officers located 
evidence linking defendant to the burglary and arrested him two days later. Id, at 486. 
The police did not have a search or arrest warrant. Id, 
In holding the search illegal, the Stoner Court reasoned that California, where the 
search occurred, did not have any law giving a "hotel proprietor blanket authority to 
authorize the police to search the rooms of the hotel's guests." Id, at 488. Moreover, the 
police did not have a reasonable belief that the hotel had authority to consent to the 
search in this case. Id "Our decisions make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth 
Amendment are not to be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by 
unrealistic doctrines of'apparent authority." Id, Finally, the Court acknowledged that a 
hotel proprietor may retain a right of access for certain activities, such as maid service 
and maintenance. Id, at 489. However, entry for the purposes of search and arrest were 
of "an entirely different order" and implicated the tenant's Fourth Amendment privacy 
interests. Id, (citing Chapman, 365 U.S. at 616). 
In Kent, the police had information that defendant and his wife were linked to 
burglaries. See 432 P.2d at 65. The couple were staying at a motel. Id, The police 
obtained consent from the hotel manager to covertly view the defendant through an air 
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vent in the ceiling of the room. Id. They overheard the wife making incriminating 
statements to defendant, and observed defendant preparing to consume drugs. Id. 
In ruling the search improper, the Utah Supreme Court noted at the outset that "it 
is the degree of privacy which the defendant enjoyed in the [hotel room] that is the 
important factor in determining the reasonableness of the search," rejecting claims that 
the proprietor's property interest in the room validated the consent. IdL at 66. Although a 
landlord has an interest in cooperating with police to assist in investigating crime and 
protect his property, it does not "constitute an ersatz in place of a warrant." Id. at 67. 
The Kent Court took care to explain the underlying privacy interests of tenants, be 
they of a hotel room or an apartment. "[T]he right of privacy gives added emphasis to 
the dignity of man" and is "protected and guaranteed against unwarranted intrusions." 
Id. at 68. "Privacy means a state apart from company or observation; it means a place of 
seclusion and secrecy." Id at 69. "The defendant had the right to maintain his place of 
abode, though it was a room in a motel. . . free from outside intrusion and observation." 
Id. When a person is unjustifiably observed, even "under unfavorable circumstances," 
the "gravamen of the harm is the injury to privacy." Id (footnote omitted). 
The foregoing compels the conclusion that Gledhill's proprietary interest in the 
rented house does not validate her consent to enter or search it. First, Allen and Earl, not 
Gledhill, exclusively occupied the rented house. R.278[8,58]. It was their home, not 
hers. Allen rented it from her. R.278[8]. They had "control for most purposes" over the 
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house, including the yard and house work, and invitation of guests of their own 
choosing. R.278[9-10]. Gledhill did not have any of these rights at the house and 
therefore lacked common authority validating her consent. Cf. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169-
171 (cohabitant in house could consent to search of areas she shared with defendant). 
The State did not offer any evidence suggesting that Gledhill retained any other 
right of common authority over the house, or any similar right of entry for other 
purposes, such as storage or parking to give her actual authority to consent. See State v. 
Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (consenting party lacked common 
authority to consent to search of defendant's house although defendant gave consentor 
the key so she could retrieve some clothing for defendant); State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 
534 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (defendant's roommate, a probationer, did not have common 
authority over defendant's car to consent to its search); Commonwealth v. Latshaw, 392 
A.2d 1301 (Pa. 1978) (landlord could consent to search of barn on property that she 
rented to defendant since agreement did not include barn and she retained access to it). 
The fact that Gledhill was there to evict Allen does not validate her consent to 
enter or search. R.278[8]. As a matter of due process, Allen was entitled to certain 
statutory measures before eviction could occur. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12 (2002) 
("[i]t is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a tenant from the tenant's premises in 
any manner except by judicial process"). The required process includes service of notice. 
See Utah Code Ann. §78-36-6 (describing requirements for service of eviction notices); 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3 (describing types of eviction notices, including three-day pay-
or-quit, three-day nuisance, three-day comply or quit, five-day tenant-at-will. and fifteen-
day no-cause). Even eviction for "nuisance" such as where a drug house is suspected 
requires a hearing and court order prior to eviction. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-38-9, -
10, -11. Gledhill testified that she did not follow any of these statutory notice 
requirements prior to going to the house with the police to evict Allen. R.278[20]. 
Consequently, she was not legally on the premises within that context either. 
In any event, Gledhill's overarching purpose in going to the house and bringing 
the police with her was based on her suspicion and personal fear that a skinhead was 
living in the house with Allen and operating a meth lab out of there. R.278[10-l 1]. 
Fourth Amendment protections are implicated where the primary purpose of a landlord's 
consent to enter and search is to investigate suspected crime. See Chapman, 365 U.S. at 
616 (landlord's consent invalid where given to search for illegal distillery rather than to 
"'view waste'" on the rented premises) (quotation omitted); Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489 
(although hotel proprietor may enter room to conduct maidservice and maintenance, 
entry for purposes of investigating crime violated Fourth Amendment). Although 
Gledhill, as a landlord, "has a duty, as well as a vital interest in cooperating with officers 
so as to remove [her]self of suspicion and the right to promptly exculpate [herjself by 
allowing a search,. . . [her] permission . . . will not constitute an ersatz in place of a 
warrant." Kent, 432 P.2d at 66-67. If anything, the officers' knowledge that they were at 
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the house where a possible meth lab was present obliged them to seek a warrant before 
entering and renders their decision to make a warrantless entry unreasonable. In fact, as 
discussed infra Point I C iv., the officers had ample opportunity to secure a warrant 
before entering the house. 
ii. Officer Brimley Did Not Have a Reasonable Belief in Gledhill's 
Apparent Authority to Search the House to Validate Her Consent. 
The trial court in the present case made a clearly erroneous finding that Officer 
Brimley, who accompanied Gledhill, R.278[26], was "justified in believing" she had 
"authority to grant consent," and that he took "reasonable steps to ensure that his entry 
was lawful by interviewing Ms. Gledhill... to ascertain her ownership, relationship to 
the property and the occupants." R.130. In fact, Officer Brimley testified at the 
suppression hearing that he got written consent from Allen, although he already had 
verbal consent from Gledhill, since "he was in control of the house al the time." 
R.278[43]. Hence, the trial court's finding is directly controverted b> the State's own 
evidence as well as unsupportable in the law as discussed below. 
Contrary to the court's finding, Gledhill did not have apparent authority to consent 
to the entry or search. See Illinois v. Rodriguez. 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990). The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Rodriguez held that a third party may give valid consent to enter 
although she lacks actual authority to do so if the police have a reasonable, albeit 
mistaken, belief that she has common authority over the premises. IdL However, if the 
officers' understanding is not reasonable, it is incumbent upon them to inquire further or 
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get a warrant. Id. Absent either precautionary measure, the consent is invalid, IcL 
A review of State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), is instructive 
regarding apparent authority. There, this Court held that police officers did not have a 
reasonable belief in a third party's apparent authority to consent under a similar set of 
facts. Id. at 1344-45. As in the present case, there was a familial relationship between 
the consentor and the defendant who were brother and sister. Id at 1342. The 
defendant lived with their mother in the mother's house. Id He paid rent and had a 
bedroom there plus shared access to the rest of the house. Id While defendant was on a 
camping trip, the mother was hospitalized and gave the daughter her key and asked her to 
get her some clothes from the house. Id. She also informed the daughter that the 
defendant might be growing marijuana in the crawlspace of the house. Id The daughter 
went to the house with her husband, who kicked open a locked door to the crawlspace 
where she found marijuana plants. Id She called the police and let them in the house. 
Id. She told them she did not live there and that her hospitalized mother gave her the key 
to get some clothes. Id She also told the officers that her brother was a tenant and was 
not present at the time, and that her husband kicked in the crawlspace door to enter. Id 
Based on these facts, the court held the search was unreasonable. Id at 1344-45. 
"As a matter of law, such facts conclusively dispel whatever indicia of authority might 
have arisen from the [familial] relationship, the delivery of keys to other parts of the 
home, and a mother's expression of concern about marijuana being grown in the 
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crawlspace by her son." Id. 
As in Rowe, the facts of the present case should have "dispel[led]" any notion of 
Brimley's that Gledhill had apparent authority to consent to the search of the rented 
house. LI at 1344. First, Brimley himself testified that Allen "was in control of the 
house at the time." R.278[43]. He further testified that he got consent to search the 
house from Allen on account of his understanding. LI 
"[T]he [additional] surrounding circumstances . . . [are] such that a reasonable 
person would doubt [that Gledhill had apparent authority] and not act upon it without 
further inquiry." Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. Brimley knew that Gledhill was the 
landlord of the house, not the tenant. R.278[43]. Although she had a key to the place, 
she did not live there. R.278[8,13]. Brimley was aware that the tenants were not evicted 
as of yet since Gledhill asked him to accompany her to help her do that. R.278[26]. 
Moreover, he knew that the tenants were present at the house since Gledhill asked him to 
accompany her there in anticipation of meeting them. Id Indeed, the facts of the present 
case are even less conclusive as to apparent authority since the consentor in Rowe 
actually had permission to enter the house, whereas Gledhill did not and, instead, showed 
up uninvited and unannounced to evict Ailen at 8:00 a.m. for the purpose of detecting a 
suspected meth lab. R.278[26]. 
Under these circumstances, a person of ^reasonable caution" would inquire 
whether Gledhill had any claim to the property beyond mere ownership that would justify 
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a warrantless entry. Id (citation omitted). However, the record is totally silent as to any 
attempt made by Brimley to further inquire into Gledhill's authority to consent. See 
generally R.278. The fact that he got consent from Allen after the fact evinces that 
Brimley was aware that Gledhill's consent was not valid. 
In addition to having an unreasonable belief in Gledhill's apparent authority, 
Brimley had ample opportunity to seek valid consent from the occupants themselves 
prior to entering or, alternatively, seek a warrant based on the information that Gledhill 
provided. See infra Point I C iv (discussing officers' opportunity to obtain warrant and 
lack of exigent circumstances). He knew the occupants were present in the house before 
he entered since Gledhill told him so. R.278[26]. He also knew of the suspected meth 
lab. Id However, Brimley did not take any of these reasonable opportunities to honor 
the Fourth Amendment rights of the occupants inside, instead relying on the 
unreasonable belief that Gledhill's consent was valid. 
Hence, the trial court made an incorrect legal conclusion that Brimley "took 
reasonable steps to ensure that his entry with the owner was lawful." R.130. In truth, 
Gledhill lacked apparent authority which might otherwise validate her consent. See 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (apparent authority to consent does not exist where 
"reasonable person would doubt" its existence); Elder, 815 P.2d at 1344-45 (third-party 
consent invalid where unsupported by officers' reasonable belief). 
C. The Illegal Entry Based on Gledhill's Invalid Consent Renders All 
Evidence Subsequently Seized inadmissible Fruit of the Poisonous Tree 
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and Taints Any Other Possible Justifications for the Warrantless Search 
and Seizure. 
Since Gledhill had neither actual nor apparent authority to consent to an entry or 
search of the house, the entry and search was illegal and all evidence subsequently seized 
is inadmissible. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963); see also 
Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1983) (extending exclusionary rule to illegal 
searches based on invalidated consent). 'The exclusionary rule prohibition extends as 
well to the indirect as the direct products o f the illegal and warrantless entry into Allen 
and Earl's house. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484. Hence, this Court need go no further in 
its analysis in deciding that the trial court erroneously denied the suppression motion and 
in reversing Earl's conviction. 
i. Evidence Seized in Plain View Is Inadmissible Since Officer Brimley 
Was Not Lawfully Present. 
In this case, Brimley testified that he walked in the front door of the house and 
observed in plain view what he considered "drug paraphernalia," including "iodine 
bottles," which were later confirmed to be iodine, "little bottles in a row next to a couch," 
"many boxes of pseudoephedrine that were stacked next to the couch," and a "bong-type 
smoking instrument on the coffee table in the living room." R.278[29].3 
3
 The evidence list presented at the suppression hearing indicates that all the 
evidence was located in Earl's backpack. R.70. Officer Scott Daniels admitted at the 
hearing that the evidence list was incorrect and that the location of the items is consistent 
with Brimley's testimony. R.278[51-52]. 
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Evidence seized in plain view is an exception to the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment. See State v. Gallegos. 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(citing State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). However, to establish 
the plain view exception, the State must show that Brimley was ""lawfully present'" in the 
house. Id (quoting State v. Romero. 660 P.2d 715. 718 (Utah 1983)). The evidence 
must also be in "'plain viewr' and "'clearly incriminating.''' Id. (quoting Romero, 660 
P.2dat718). 
Brimley's observation of this evidence4 does not fall within the plain view 
exception because, as noted supra Point LB., he was not lawfully present in the house. 
Gledhill did not have the actual or apparent authority to consent to the entry which 
allowed him access to the area where he observed the items. This is a marked contrast to 
other cases concerning items observed in plain view where the officers were lawfully 
present. See Romero, 660 P.2d at 718 (police were at defendant's residence pursuant to a 
valid search warrant and limited their search to the geographical areas delineated 
therein); State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 650 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (state trooper viewed 
open container during lawful traffic stop); State v. Nield, 804 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (officer observed contraband during lawful search warrant of defendant's 
house). 
4
 Earl does not contend on appeal that the evidence was not in plain view or that it 
was not clearly incriminating. See Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 976. 
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ii. Allen's Written Consent Is Involuntary and Tainted Given the Prior 
Illegal Entry. In Any Event, it Does Not Justify the Search of Earl's 
Backpack since it Was Limited to a Search of His Own Property and the 
Officers Did Not Have a Reasonable Belief That Earl's Backpack Belonged 
to Allen or That Allen Had Common Authority over it. 
a. Allen's Consent Was Involuntary and Tainted by the Illegal Entry. 
Allen's subsequent written consent to search the house is involuntary in light of 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the illegal entry. Moreover, it is 
insufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry to purge the taint and, consequently, was 
impermissibly obtained by exploitation of the prior police misconduct. See State v. 
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1265 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). "'Evidence obtained in 
searches following police illegality must meet both tests to be admissible.fV Thurman, 
846 P.2d at 1265 (quotation omitted). 
Although this analysis most often arises in situations where the defendant himself 
consents to a search, it applies with equal force in the present context involving third-
party consent. In United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1989), the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the analysis to a consent given by defendant's wife, 
Mrs. Maez, immediately after the defendant was illegally arrested at their home. Id at 
1453-56: see also United States v. McCoy. 839 F.Supp. 1442, 1447 (D. Or. 1993) 
(applying voluntariness/exploitation analysis to third party consent in holding it tainted). 
The Court cited to United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) and Wong Sun, 371 
U.S. 471, in rejecting the government's claim that Mrs. Maez's consent could not be 
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tainted because she was not the one illegally arrested. IdL at 1453. 
The Maez Court framed the issue as ''whether 'granting establishment of the 
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objections is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint.'" IcL (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488). The Court stated 
that Ceccolini "mandated" that the analysis be applied in the context of third party 
consents. IcL "While the primary issue before the [Ceccolini] Court was whether a 
categorical distinction should be drawn between physical and verbal evidence found as 
the result of an unlawful search, the Court specifically noted that the witness whose 
testimony was at issue was not a defendant." Id. at 1453 (citing Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 
275, 277). "Thus, the defendant could raise the taint issue as to the statements made by 
his employee. And while the witness in Ceccolini gave statements, as opposed to a 
consent to search, the same analysis is required here." IcL at 1454. 
In light of the foregoing, the voluntariness/exploitation analysis of Thurman 
applies to the instant case involving the third party consent of Allen. Allen signed a 
written consent form permitting the officers to search his house. R.69 (Signed Written 
Consent Form - Addendum C). The pre-formulated consent form contains a provision 
which states, "I give permission [for the search] voluntarily without any threat, coercion, 
or unlawful influence of any kind having been made to induce me to give my consent. I 
UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REFUSE THE 
27 
SEARCH." R.69 (emphasis original). Allen's signature is at the bottom of the form, id 
The trial court made a legal finding that Allen's consent was "voluntarily granted." 
R.130. Although Earl does not contest that consent was given, he does challenge the 
voluntariness of it. "[Voluntariness is a legal conclusion, which is reviewed for 
correctness." Hansen. 2002 UT 125, ^ 51 (citing Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1271). 
Voluntariness is analyzed under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at f^ 56 
(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 226, 248 (1973)) (othe r citations 
omitted). The facts of the case must show that "consent was given without duress or 
coercion." Id at [^ 57 (citations omitted). In this case, the atmosphere was pervaded with 
police authority and an "air of intimidation." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1272. The police 
entered the house without knocking at an early hour, 8:00 a.m.. Id (noting entry without 
knocking deprives occupants opportunity to maintain control over abode and keep 
encounter with police "civil"). 
They came for the purpose of investigating a suspected meth lab and protecting 
Gledhill against what she supposed would be a hostile eviction encounter. R.278[26]. 
Hence the police had a mind set that this was not a consensual encounter, but rather an 
investigation amidst a potentially dangerous situation. In fact, Brimley testified that he 
had safety concerns upon entering the house and seeing the men in the kitchen since 
knives were accessible there. R.278[31]. 
In addition, there were two officers present, Brimley and Loosle. R.278[27]. 
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They were uniformed and armed, although their weapons were not drawn. R.278[28]. 
They ordered all the men out of the kitchen, and eventually onto the front lawn, for safety 
purposes. R.278[31,41]. They frisked all the men for safety purposes as well. 
R.278[40]. They detained the men and asked for their identification. R.278[40]; see 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1219 (Utah 1993) (prosecution bears more burden to 
establish voluntariness when consentor is in custody). It was in the midst of all this that 
Brimley asked Allen for his consent, stating, "I had taken everybody out, because of my 
[safety] concerns, everybody was out on the front lawn, and I asked Mr. Jeremy Allen for 
consent to search, which he signed a form." R.278[35]. 
Such an exhibition of police force and authority negated the voluntariness of 
Allen's consent. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at J^57. In the face of a surprise entry from 
uniformed officers early in the morning, and in the midst of being ordered out of the 
kitchen and house, then frisked and detained, Allen's "'capacity for self-determination 
[was] critically impaired.'" IcL (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225). The fact that the 
written consent form contained language that it was not obtained through coercion or 
inducement is of no consequence given the overbearing police presence. R.69. In 
addition, the words ring hollow considering that they were not penned by Allen, but part 
of the pre-formulated form presented to him amidst the police flurry. Moreover, the 
State did not present any evidence that Brimley verbally informed Allen of his right to 
refuse, or any evidence that Allen actually read through the form and understood his 
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rights as written. See generally R.278. Consequently, a reasonable person in his position 
would not have felt free to decline consent despite such language. Indeed, one would 
have felt that the search was inevitable. Hence, the trial court's legal conclusion that 
Allen's consent was voluntary is incorrect as a matter of law and unsupportable under the 
evidence. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at |^51 (citation omitted). 
Even if the consent was voluntary, it is the product of police exploitation of the 
illegal entry gained on account of Gledhill's invalid consent to enter. See id. at ^[61. 
"Whether a person's consent was obtained by police exploitation of a prior [illegal entry] 
is ultimately a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness." Id (citing Thurman, 846 P.2d 
at 1271-72). 
"[T]he purpose behind excluding evidence obtained by police exploitation is %to 
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by 
removing the incentive to disregard it.'" Id at [^62 (quotations omitted). "When 
conducting the exploitation analysis, we always keep in mind this deterrence purpose." 
Id. at |^63 (citations omitted). "Moreover, we recognize the need for deterrence is 
strongest where criminal sanctions against the defendant may result." Id 
An exploitation analysis is a fact-sensitive inquiry. Id at ^64. Three factors are 
relevant: "(1) the 'purpose and flagrancy' of the illegal conduct, (2) 'the presence of 
intervening circumstances,' and (3) the 'temporal proximity' between the illegal detention 
and consent." Id. (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590. 603-04 (1975)). The 
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"'purpose and flagrancy'" factor is directly related to the "deterrent value of suppression." 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (quotation omitted). 
Under these factors, Allen's consent is not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal 
entry to provide a constitutional basis for the search. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491 
(citations omitted). First, the "'purpose and flagrancy'" of Brimley's illegal conduct is 
directly related to his request for consent from Allen. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 
^{65-66 (quotation omitted). Brimley testified that he obtained consent to search the 
house from Gledhill. R.278[43]. He additionally testified, however, that he "also got it 
from Jeremy Allen, since he was in control of the house at the time." Id. Brimley's 
testimony establishes that he knew Gledhill could not provide valid consent to enter or 
search the house. However, he used it to get inside so that he could ask consent of Allen 
directly. "The incentive present in this case to violate constitutional guarantees by 
seizing upon an ambiguity and then using that violation to obtain consent to search is 
precisely the type of incentive that must be removed by excluding evidence obtained 
thereby." State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 1995) (police exploited 
unconstitutional road block to gain consent to search defendant's car). 
In addition, there were no intervening factors that purge the taint of the illegal 
entry. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^|68. "Intervening circumstances may include such 
events as an officer telling a person he or she has the right to refuse consent or to consult 
with an attorney." Id (citations omitted). In this case, the pre-formulated consent form 
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contained a provision that indicated the signor was not induced or coerced into giving 
consent against his will as well as a statement in bold letters that he had the right to 
refuse consent. R.69. As noted in Maez, however, this fact is merely probative of 
voluntariness, not dispositive. See 872 F.2d at 1456. It can be overridden by other 
factors at play when a person gives consent. TdL 
In fact, Allen's consent was undermined by a variety of circumstances. As 
discussed above, the language in the form was not penned by Allen; it was not his choice 
of words although he signed the bottom of the form. Nothing in the record indicates that 
he was verbally informed of his right to refuse or that he actually took time to read it and 
understand its meaning. See generally R.278; cf Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273 (taint 
dissipated where defendant was given two Miranda warnings prior to consent). In the 
midst of all the police activity, including the unannounced entry, the Terry frisks, and the 
detentions of all the people at the house, it is doubtful that he did or, if so, that he felt he 
really had the option of asserting his rights. Consequently, as in Maez, the fact that Allen 
was informed in writing of his right to refuse does not in and of itself render his consent 
voluntary. See 872 F.2d at 1456 (although consentor was informed that she could refuse, 
she testified that police said they would get a warrant if she did not consent). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Shoulderblade, in dictum, postulated that "the 
independent discovery of additional inculpatory evidence giving the police probable 
cause to arrest an individual can attenuate a previous improper arrest from a subsequent 
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confession by the accused." 905 P.2d at 295 (citations omitted). In this case, the 
previous illegal entry is not attenuated from Allen's consent by Brimley's intervening 
discovery of the paraphernalia in plain view in the living room. As noted supra Point 
I.C.i., that discovery is tainted by the illegal entry as well; an officer must be lawfully 
present in order for evidence to be admissible under the plain view doctrine. See 
Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 976. As such, the evidence was not 'windependent[]ly" discovered 
by the police. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 295. Indeed, the evidence was only 
discovered because the police were illegally inside the house. This does not constitute 
the hypothetical attenuation contemplated by Shoulderblade. See id. 
Lastly, there is no temporal proximity that purges the taint of the illegal entry on 
Allen's consent. "A brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment violation and consent 
often indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to 
dissipate." Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 293 (citation omitted). Here there was very little 
time between the illegal entry and Allen's consent. As a matter of fact, the events seemed 
to happen contemporaneously: Brimley entered the house, he saw the paraphernalia in 
the living room, he saw the men sitting at the table in the kitchen, he asked the men to 
step out of the kitchen, the men were detained, frisked, and asked for their identification, 
then taken outside where Brimley asked Allen for consent to search the house. 
R.278[28-32,35]. The State did not present any evidence that Allen had time between 
the illegal entry and his consent to consider his situation in a "calmer setting, far removed 
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from the [earlier] events." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273 (taint dissipated where five hours 
passed between illegal entry and defendant's consent). "On these facts, it is apparent that 
[Brimley] exploited the [illegal entry] to gain permission to search" the house. 
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 294 (consent tainted where officer asked defendant's 
permission to search car right after stopping car at illegal road block); see also Hansen. 
2002 UT 125 at |^69 (taint did not dissipate where "negligible" time lapsed between 
illegal detention and officer's request to search defendant's car). 
Given that Allen's consent is neither voluntary nor attenuated from the illegal 
entry, it cannot serve as a constitutional basis for justifying a search of the house, either 
as to the living room where the paraphernalia was found or Earl's backpack, which sat on 
the floor in the living room by the couch. See Maez, 872 F.2d at 1454-55. 
b. Allen's Consent to Search Was Limited to His Property Alone and the 
Officers Did Not Have a Reasonable Belief That Earl's Backpack Belonged 
to Allen or That Allen Had Common Authority over it to Validate His 
Consent to Search it. 
Assuming for the sake of argument only that Allen's consent was proper under the 
Fourth Amendment, it still does not justify the search of Earl's backpack since the 
consent was limited by the terms of the written consent itself to "property that is under 
[Allen's] care, custody, or control." R.69 (Allen's Written Consent Form). 
Brimley admitted at the suppression hearing that Allen's consent was limited to 
property under his control. R.278[42]. Nonetheless, he testified that he searched the 
backpack belonging to Earl. According to Brimley, Allen did not inform him that it 
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belonged to Earl until after it was searched. R.278[36,42-43]. In the backpack Brimley 
located two iodine bottles, scales, an instruction book on how to cook meth, red 
phosphorous and court documents linked to Earl. R.278[36]. 
Like Gledhill, Allen had neither the actual or apparent authority to consent to a 
search of the backpack. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171-72; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. 
First, Allen did not have actual authority because he did not own the backpack or have 
any right of access to it to justify his consent. Indeed, Brimley testified that Allen 
informed him that the backpack did not belong to him. R.278[36,42-43]. The State did 
not present any evidence that the backpack belonged to Allen or was shared by him. See 
generally R.278. 
A review of Frazierv. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), illustrates well that authority to 
consent derives only from a person's ownership or right of access to a bag. In Frazier, 
the police searched a duffel bag belonging to the defendant and his cousin, Rawls. Id at 
740. Rawls pointed the police to the bag and consented to its search. Id. The police 
found some inculpatory clothing belonging to defendant. Id The Court stated, u[s]ince 
Rawls was a joint user of the bag, he clearly had authority to consent to its search." Id. 
"Petitioner, in allowing Rawls to use the bag and in leaving it in his house, must be taken 
to have assumed the risk that Rawls would allow someone else to look inside." Id 
Hence, the search was upheld. Id 
This Court in State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), adopted 
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Frazier's reasoning in holding that defendant's wife had common authority over a diaper 
bag and, therefore, actual authority to consent to its search, which uncovered a gun that 
linked defendant to a homicide. IcL at 783 (citing Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740). "It is quite 
clear that either party sharing joint use of property can, under the [F |ourth [AJmendment, 
give valid consent to a search of that property." Id. 
Contrary to the defendants in Frazier or Harrison, none of the State's evidence 
establishes that Allen shared the backpack with Earl, or that he otherwise had access to it. 
See generally R.278. Rather, the backpack belonged to Earl alone and was accessed by 
only him. Id. Consequently, unlike Frazier and Harrison, Allen lacked the common 
authority over the backpack to validate his consent to search. See Frazier, 394 U.S. at 
740; Harrison, 805 P.2d at 783. 
Allen similarly lacked apparent authority to consent to a search of Earl's backpack. 
Brimley admitted that he understood Allen's consent applied only to items belonging to 
him. R.278[42]. The consent form itself expressly states that Allen gave consent only as 
to "property that is in my care, custody, and control. . . . I understand that I may only give 
permission to search property that is under my care, custody or control." R.69. Although 
Brimley testified that Allen did not inform him that the backpack belonged to Earl until 
after the search was complete, he did not expressly state that he believed the backpack 
belonged to Allen during the search itself. R.278[25-47]. 
Assuming that Brimley had a mistaken belief that the backpack belonged to Allen 
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and therefore fell within the sweep of his consent, this fact in and of itself does not 
justify the search because the other factors surrounding it were ambiguous and should 
have alerted Brimley to the necessity of inquiring further about the true owner of the 
backpack. See Rodriguez. 497 U.S. at 188. Illinois v. James. 645 N.E.2d 195 (111. 
1994), is instructive on this point. In that case, the defendant was a passenger in a car 
that was stopped by the police. Id. at 197. The police directed the driver and passengers 
to step out of the car. Id. When the defendant exited, she left her purse in the front 
passenger seat. Id An officer escorted her away from the car. Id While defendant was 
unaware, the driver agreed to a search of the car. Id. at 198. The officers opened the 
purse and found drug paraphernalia. Id 
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the officers did not have a reasonable belief 
in the driver's authority to consent to the search of defendant's purse. Id. at 203. First, 
the Court noted that a third party's consent to search "does not extend to an item . . . that 
belongs exclusively" to another person. Id (citing United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761 
(9th Cir. 1993)) (passenger's consent of car search did not permit search of companion's 
purse) (other citations omitted). 
The Court went on to note the particular facts of the case undercutting the 
reasonableness of the officer's belief in the driver's authority to consent. 
[I]t would have been objectively reasonable for the law enforcement officer 
to realize that the purse might belong to one of the passengers rather than to 
[the driver]. A purse is normally carried by a woman, and all of the adult 
occupants of the vehicle were women. Thus, the purse could logically have 
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belonged to any one of the three adult women in the car. The purse was 
found on a passenger seat in the car, not on the driver's seat, thereby 
tending to the conclusion that the purse belonged to the passenger, not the 
driver. It would have been unreasonable for the officer to believe that [the 
driver] shared some common use in the purse with one of the passengers . . 
. since a purse is generally not an object for which two or more persons 
share common use and authority. 
Id. at 203. The Court further reasoned that the defendant was unaware that the driver 
gave consent to search the car, and that she did not know the police intended to search 
the car when they asked her to exit it. IcL "Under these circumstances, the defendant did 
not abandon her purse in the vehicle, nor did she assume the risk that someone might 
look into her purse if she left it in the car." Id 
As in James, Brimley's belief in Allen's authority to consent to the search of the 
backpack is undermined by a host of factors that should have alerted him to the necessity 
of determining its owner prior to searching it. First, Brimley was aware that Allen was 
not the only person in the house. R.278[28]. Brimley's own testimony established that 
there were four men present who may have owned the backpack. Id. 
Additionally, a backpack is the male equivalent of the woman's purse at issue in 
James to the extent that it is likely to be used exclusively by a man and not jointly among 
many. See 645 N.E.2d at 203. The necessity of determining the backpack's owner was 
even more pressing considering that it was sitting in the living room, a common area 
where anyone could have left it, as opposed to an area of the house where Allen alone 
had access (i.e. - a bedroom). R.278[22]. 
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Finally, as in James, none of the State's evidence establishes that Earl was aware 
that the search was going on or that Allen consented to it in the first place. See 645 
N.E.2d at 203. As Brimley testified, the men were outside the house when he 
approached Allen to ask for consent to search. R.278[35]. Brimley did not state that 
Earl was privy to the conversation with Allen or otherwise made aware of the consent to 
search. See generally R.278. The record also lacks any evidence that Brimley informed 
any of the other men, including Earl, that they had a right to refuse consent to search their 
belongings. See United States v. Poole. 307 F.Supp. 1185, 1190 (D. La. 1969) (officer 
did not have reasonable belief in third party authority to consent where other people were 
present in apartment who could have owned searched bag; "simple expedient of 
informing [all present] that [they] had right to object to search" would have avoided 
illegal search). Consequently, Earl did not have the opportunity to protest the search of 
his backpack. See United States v. Langston. 970 F.2d 692, 698 (10th Cir. 1992) (officer 
had reasonable belief in third party's authority to consent where defendant remained 
silent while aware of consent and assisted in search). 
Yet, despite all the ambiguity of the circumstances surrounding the ownership of 
the backpack, Brimley failed to further inquire into it's ownership. See Rodriguez, 497 
U.S. at 188. Failure to do so does not meet the reasonableness standard of the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. 
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iii. The Evidence Is Not Admissible Pursuant to a Search Incident to Earl's 
Arrest since it Is Tainted by the Initial Unlawful Entry and Is Unreasonable 
under the Totality of the Circumstances. 
The trial court entered findings of fact indicating that the men in the house were 
asked for identification. R.129. "The Defendant indicated he had no proper 
identification, and stated his name was 'Justin Ganon.'" R.129. During a patdown of 
Earl, Brimley located his wallet. R.129 Earl granted Brimley permission to remove the 
wallet and look inside. Id The wallet contained Earl's identification with the name 
Joshua John Earl on it. Id Earl was taken into custody for presenting false identification 
to a police officer. Id; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1999) (criminalizing act of 
providing false identification to peace officer); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1999) 
(authorizing officer to arrest person who commits offense in his presence). The court 
made the following legal conclusions: Earl's arrest was lawful. R.131. His backpack 
was within his immediate control, and its search was contemporaneous with his arrest. 
R.131-32. Hence, the evidence is admissible as a search incident to an arrest. R.132. 
The trial court's findings and legal conclusions do not explain the legal basis for 
its holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest, occurring as a result of the initial 
illegal entry, justifies the admission of the evidence found on the coffee table and in 
Earl's backpack. See generally R. 127-32. In fact, there is no such legal justification. 
Utah law allows a defendant to be arrested pursuant to an illegal entry if he 
commits an "intervening illegal act." State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1997). The rationale underlying this rule is to deny defendants "carte blanch to 
commit further criminal acts" at the cost of society's interest in deterring police conduct. 
Id 
While arrest for an intervening illegal act is sound, a warrantless search pursuant 
to such arrest is not. Just as society must not give "carte blanche" to criminals in this 
context, society must also guard against giving "carte blanche" to officers who want to 
search for evidence under the guise that they have made a lawful arrest on account of 
their illegal entry. Id; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1999) (providing for 
warrantless arrest, but not warrantless search). Allowing officers to search an arrestee 
under these circumstances, without more, undermines the deterrent value of suppression. 
See Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at fflf 62, 65 (citations omitted). Indeed, a per se rule allowing 
a search incident to an arrest where the arrest was precipitated by an illegal entry gives 
police "blanket authority to search wherever they please[] and for whatever might pique 
their interest." State v. DeBoov, 2000 UT 32, 1J26, 996 P.2d 546 (Fourth Amendment 
drafted to protect against abusive practices under general warrants). It also gives police a 
disincentive to honor constitutional guarantees of privacy. See Hansen, 2000 UT 125 at 
|^62 (citations omitted). 
Hence, the taint of the illegal entry upon a search incident to an arrest 
differentiates this case from cases involving searches incident to arrest where there is no 
taint. As noted in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), a search incident to arrest 
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where there is no precipitating illegal conduct is justified so long as it is 
contemporaneous with the arrest and it is limited to the area within the arrestee's 
immediate control. LI at 763-64. This type of search is justified on the basis of officer 
safety and the need to preserve evidence. IcL at 763. 
Where there is prior illegal police conduct, an extra layer of analysis is required to 
ensure that the officers are not exploiting the illegal conduct to arrest a person and search 
their belongings under the pretext of a search incident to arrest. As noted in Wong Sun , 
where police misconduct is an issue, the Fourth Amendment requires that "the evidence . 
. . has [not] been come at by exploitation of that illegality." 371 U.S. at 488. Indeed, it is 
incumbent upon courts to ensure that evidence gained by precipitory police misconduct is 
not admitted against defendants so as to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. See 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (exclusionary rule serves the "vital function" of 
maintaining "judicial integrity'") (quotation omitted). 
A broader inquiry than the one set forth in Chimel is thus necessary. That broader 
inquiry must look into the reasonableness of the search under the totality of the 
circumstances. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19; State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1139 (Utah 
1989). As noted in Terry, the reasonableness of the officer's actions under the totality of 
the circumstances is particularly relevant. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. "Anything less 
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more 
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to 
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sanction." Id at 22 (citations omitted). "And simple 'good faith . . . is not enough.'... If 
subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects,' only in the discretion of the police." Id. (citation omitted) 
Moreover, inquires under the Fourth Amendment "'always should be conducted 
with the deterrent purpose of the . . . exclusionary rule sharply in focus.'" Thurman, 846 
P.2d at 1263 (quoting Brown. 422 U.S. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring)). Consequently, 
where taint is an issue, an intervening offense after the illegal entry is not dispositive as 
to whether the subsequent search was permissible. An intervening act nullifies the 
exclusionary rule only if "excluding the evidence will [not] effectively deter future 
illegalities." Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 292. As such, intervening illegal conduct is but 
one factor that must be assessed in light of all other factors in Earl's case, including the 
taint or exploitation of the prior illegal entry. 
Appellate courts have recognized these principles in determining whether a 
confession or a consent to a search is sufficiently attenuated from illegal police conduct 
such that suppression would have any deterrent effect. See supra Point I C ii. (a). In 
addition to considering the presence of an intervening criminal act, these courts consider 
the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct, and the temporal proximity of the 
misconduct to the search. See United States v. Ramirez, 91 F.3d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 
1996), reversed on other grounds. 523 U.S. 65 (1998); Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d at 292. 
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In light of the foregoing and under the totality of the circumstances, the search 
incident to Earl's arrest was unreasonable and not sufficiently attenuated from the prior 
illegal entry to permit admission of the evidence. IcL First, Earl was arrested for the non-
violent offense of providing false i.d. to a police officer. R.278[33]. This is not the sort 
of crime associated with violent weapons and which might otherwise justify a limited 
search in the interests of police safety. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (protective frisk 
reasonable given defendants were suspected of "daylight robbery" that is "likely to 
involve the use of weapons"). 
Moreover, Brimley did not testify that Earl was behaving in a manner that would 
suggest he might pose a threat to the officers. Quite the opposite, Brimleyfs testimony 
establishes that Earl was cooperating with police and was honest about the presence of 
weapons. Brimley asked Earl directly whether he had weapons on him. R.278[32]. Earl 
admitted that he did. IcL During the subsequent frisk, Brimley recovered the knives that 
Earl carried - one in his pants and another in a pocket. R.278[32-33]. Brimley also 
testified that he did not observe any threatening gestures from any of the men, including 
Earl. R.278[41];cf State v.Trane, 2002 UT 97, TJ22 n.3, 57 P.3d 1052 ("exigent 
circumstances existed here where Trane began to resist the officers physically and 
violently, thereby placing in question their safety"). 
If anything, Brimley's subsequent behavior betrays his intent to exploit the prior 
illegal entry to conduct a search and that he was not genuinely concerned about the 
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presence of weapons in Earl's backpack. See. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^66 (officer 
exploited illegal detention by asking defendant if he could search car although officer did 
not have suspicion of further illegality). Brimley testified that he sat Earl on the couch 
after he recovered the knives and Earl's wallet with his i.d.. R.278[33]. Brimley testified 
that Earl was within eight to ten feet of the backpack at that point. R.278[37]. 
Despite Earl's proximity to the pack, Brimley did not search it at that point as an 
officer might do if he was concerned that Earl would reach into it and grab a weapon. 
Rather, he took the time to take all the men outside onto the front lawn, then asked Allen 
for consent, had Allen sign a consent form, and then searched the pack. R.278[ 35]. 
Brimley's procrastination in searching the pack is not consistent with an officer who is 
genuinely concerned about an arrestee's potential access to weapons or destruction of 
evidence. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (search incident to arrest justified by officer 
safety and preservation of evidence). 
In fact, Brimley had already taken several precautions to ensure officer safety such 
that the additional warrantless intrusion into the backpack is unjustified. Prior to 
searching the pack, he removed all the men from the kitchen where knives were likely 
kept. R.278[31]. He frisked them all and asked them if they had weapons. R.278[32]. 
He detained them and ultimately removed them to the front yard. R.278[40,45]. 
Moreover, at least Earl was handcuffed (the record is unclear about the other men). 
R.278[33]. Consequently, Brimley was unreasonable in searching the backpack without 
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a warrant under the circumstances. If anything. Earl and the other men were so far 
removed from the pack by the time it was searched that any threat to officer safety or 
evidence was obviated. See State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(exigency dissipated where suspects were handcuffed and detained). 
iv. There Were No Other Exigent Circumstances That Merited a 
Warrantless Search; the Officers Had Time to Obtain a Warrant as 
Required by the Fourth Amendment. 
In addition to the foregoing, there were no other exigencies that justify the search 
and seizure that occurred in this case. In fact, Brimley had "'abundant opportunity [to 
obtain a warrant] and to proceed in an orderly way. . . .; there was no probability of 
material change in the situation during the time necessary to secure such warrant.'" 
Chapman, 365 U.S. at 614 (quotation omitted). "[W]hen a private residence is involved, 
the State's burden in proving probable cause and exigent circumstances is 'particularly 
heavy.'" State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotation and citation 
omitted). "This elevated burden is a result of the 'heightened expectation of privacy' that 
citizens enjoy in their own homes." Id (quotation and citation omitted). 
First, the search "was of permanent premises, not of a movable vehicle." 
Chapman, 365 U.S. at 615. Consequently, there was little risk of losing the evidence. 
See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1237 (Utah 1996) (defendant in movable car 
created exigency since he could drive off with evidence). Moreover, the house was in a 
populated urban area, as opposed to an isolated area where it would be difficult to get 
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backup, attain a warrant, or where an officer's safety might be unreasonably 
compromised by the desolation of the place. See State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854 
(Utah 1992) (exigency arose considering isolation and distance from other people). 
The State did not present any evidence that the men inside the house were aware 
that Brimley was coming with Gledhill. Hence, there was similarly no risk of destruction 
of evidence by suspects alerted to their own "peril." State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 
(Utah 1978) (exigent circumstance occurred where defendant was aware that police 
suspected him of crime, giving him motive to destroy evidence). Similarly, Brimley did 
not "indicate^ any belief that [the men] in or outside the home were likely to seize the 
contraband." State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). 
"Because 'there is almost always a partisan who might destroy or conceal evidence,' the 
State must show more than 'a mere possibility that evidence might be removed.'" IcL at 
389-90 (quotation and citation omitted) (State failed to show that officers reasonably 
believed that evidence would be destroyed or concealed prior to illegal search). 
In addition, there was no evidence of imminent physical danger to anyone inside 
the house. Gledhill did not report to Brimley that someone could be hurt. See Salt Lake 
City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, ^  10, 994 P.2d 1283 (medical emergency justifies 
warrantless search); In re A.R., 937 P.2d 1037, 1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (no exigency 
where children who were allegedly neglected were found safe on front lawn outside 
defendant's home prior to search). 
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The evidence also establishes that Brimley had ample time to obtain a warrant 
prior to entering the house. Unlike an officer who unwittingly happens upon a crime in 
progress and has to make a snap decision to investigate, Brimley was aware before he 
even entered the house that a meth lab could be inside. He discussed this fact with 
Gledhill before they entered. R.278[26]. With this knowledge, he could have taken the 
opportunity to call in for a telephone warrant without undue delay. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-23-204(2) (1999) (providing for telephonic search warrant where time does not 
permit written affidavit from officer); see also State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 
1990) (time it would take to secure warrant considered under exigency analysis). 
Gledhill testified that she had a cellular phone, so Brimley could have used her phone if 
he did not have one of his own. R.278[ 11]. The State did not present evidence that 
Brimley's failure to capitalize on the opportunity to get the warrant was borne out of 
anything more than inconvenience or a slight delay. "These are never very convincing 
reasons and . . . are not enough to by-pass the constitutional requirement." Chapman, 
365 U.S. at 615. 
Even after Brimley and Gledhill entered the house, there were no exigencies 
justifying further warrantless intrusion. Brimley testified that the men were behaving in 
a calm and non-threatening manner. R.278[41]. They did not appear agitated or 
distressed despite their awareness of the police presence. See Brown., 853 P.2d at 854 
(warrantless search justified given agitation and distress exhibited by camp personnel 
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after homicide). They obeyed Brimley's orders to exit the kitchen and eventually the 
house. See Trane, 2002 UT 97 at |^22 n.3 (exigency arose where defendant violently 
resisted arrest). Moreover, after the men were asked out of the kitchen, a second officer, 
Loosle, arrived to provide back-up. R.278[27]. Between Brimley and Loosle, one of the 
officers could have stood guard over the men and the scene while the other called in for a 
warrant to proceed with the search. See State v. Mavcock, 947 P.2d 695, 698 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) (since only one officer was present at scene, securing warrant was not 
possible without risk that suspect might flee or destroy evidence). 
Finally, the men were secured from the evidence and potential weapons, and a 
crime was not in progress. Brimley testified that the men were removed from the 
kitchen, frisked, detained, and then taken outside before he sought consent from Allen. 
R.278[35]. He did not report that they were involved in a crime when he saw them, only 
that they were looking at a computer. R.27[ 14,27]; see State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 
1277 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (less exigency is involved where the crime is not going on 
at the time the police enter). Consequently, the concern for officer safety was obviated at 
least at that point. See Wells, 928 P.2d at 389 (exigencies "dissipated" once suspects 
were "handcuffed and in custody"). 
In addition, the record does not reflect that the men were close enough to the 
evidence in the living room to suggest a risk that evidence would be destroyed. In fact, 
the men were in the kitchen when Brimley first entered the house. R.278[27]. A partial 
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wall divided them from the room where the evidence was located, and according to 
Brimley's own estimate, they were approximately twenty feet from the paraphernalia. 
R.278[31,36]. As such, it was physically impossible for the men to reach the evidence or 
destroy it. Moreover, Earl was outside the house, handcuffed, when Brimley searched 
his backpack. R.278[33,35]. Where Brimley and Loosle "had controlled the . . . 
situation," there was no exigent justification for the search. Wells, 928 P.2d at 389. 
"Considering the 'mosaic of evidence"' in this case, exigent circumstances did not 
justify Brimley's illegal entry into the house or his subsequent failure to obtain a warrant. 
Id at 390 (quotation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Earl respectfully request this Court to reverse the trial 
court's denial of the suppression motion and remand for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 7 * day of February, 2003. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY (J 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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1. POSSESSION OF A DRUG PRECURSOR (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/29/2002 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A DRUG 
PRECURSOR a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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Case No: 011919597 
Date: Sep 16, 2002 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
COURT IMPOSED 1-15 YEARS PRISON, CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. 
Dated this day of , 20 . 
SHEILA K. MCCLEVE 
District Court Judge 
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?ILEO DISTRICT COURS 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 8 2002 
MARK SHURTLEFF #4666
 S A^KEOOUNTY ;M 
Utah Attorney General _ 
Colleen K. Coebergh #8052 Deputy ae* 
Assistant Attorney General 
348 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801)524-3080 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARI MEN T 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, S1 A I E Ob U i AH 
THF <?T A T P O P T TT A H Screened by: Colleen K. Coebergh 
Assigned to: Colleen K. Coebergh 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSHUA JOHN EARL ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Defendant. 
Case No. 011919597 
Judge Hon. Sheila McCleve 
This matter having come before the Court on the 3rd day of April, 2002, on the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the State of Utah, appearing by and through its prosecutor, 
Colleen K. Coebergh, Defendant appearing personally and by and through his counsel, Ralph 
Dellapiana of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association; the Court having heard and considered 
testimony of witnesses Sheila Gledhill, Dean Brimley, and Scott Daniels, and having received 
and considered Defendant's Motion, the State's Response thereto, and the Defendant's Reply, 
and being fully advised in the premises DENIED Defendant's Motion at hearing April 15th, 2002, 
for grounds and reasons outlined herein. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
(1) Property owner Sheila Gledhill requested assistance of the police to enter into her 
property at 34 West 2700 South, an address within South Salt Lake City. 
(2) Ms. Gledhill reported her belief that drug activity was occurring at the residence, 
and stated her intention to enter to evict her son, Jeremy Allen, but was afraid of 
other individuals who might be within the apartment, and requested the police go 
along to ensure her safety. 
(3) Jeremy Allen was the only person whom Sheila Gledhill had authorized to live at 
the address. 
(4) The Officer followed Sheila Gledhill as she entered the front room after opening 
the locked front door with her key. 
(5) From the landing just inside the front door, the Officer could see four males. 
(6) At least three of the males were in a kitchen area, presumably where they could 
have access to knives or other sharp objects. 
(7) Also from the landing area, in an adjacent living room area could be seen drug 
paraphernalia as well as boxes of pseudoephedrine-based medicine, bottles later 
determined to be iodine, a red substance visually consistent with red phosphorus. 
(8) Defendant Joshua John Allen was the male sitting closest to the doorway to the 
livingroom, and as such was closest, within eight to ten feet, to a backpack sitting 
in the area of the couch. 
(9) Substantially contemporaneously with another Officer's arrival, Officer Dean 
Brimley summoned the four males toward him for the purpose of identifying 
them, and removing them from the kitchen for officer safety reasons. 
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n ^ ; : *e males were asked for identification. 
(11) The Defendant indicated he had no proper identification, and stated his name was 
"Justin Ganoii." 
(;. During the pat down of Defendant, a long knife was found concealed under his 
clothing in the small of his back. 
(13) Another knife was found in his front pants pocket. 
(14) I he Of f icer f elt v - 1 lat 1 le believ ed to be a w allet ii i Def endai it's pocket 
(15) The Defendant was asked for, and granted permission for Officers to remove the 
wallet. 
Inside the wallet was identif icatioi I ii idicatii lg Defendai it's ti i le idei itit> vv as tl lat 
of Joshua John Earl. 
H~ Defendant was taken ni< ,.-;r*h for false information. 
. * . • :. <pack i leai on: oi i til le coucl i was Defei idant's. 
(19) Evidence was found in the backpack pertinent to the clandestine laboratory 
offense charged as well as documents suggesting the pack indeed belonged to 
Defendant. 
(20) Jeremy Allen signed a written "consent to search" form authorizing the Officer to 
search 34 West 2700 South. 
(21) I he Coi n I: fii ids that SI: leila Gledhill gi ai ited coi lsei it tc searcl i tl le i esidei ice. 
(22) Though the Defendant took the stand on April 3rd, 2002, and asserted that he had 
been living at or staying at the residence overnight, the Court finds that testimony 
was not credible, and discounts it entirely. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
/1X
 Though the initial entry by Officer Brimley was "warrantless," he accompanied 
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the landowner at her request. Therefore, the Court finds that because the 
landowner had a right to enter the property to inspect it, she could confer upon the 
Officer, her invitee, the right to enter with her. 
(2) In other words, entry was with consent given by a person authorized to give 
consent. 
(3) Further, Officer Brimley was justified in believing Ms. Gledhill had authority to 
grant consent to enter the residence, going with her as he did for her inspection of 
the property, and in furtherance of her request to "keep the peace" or protect her 
from unknown dangers during the eviction notice. 
(4) Officer Brimley took reasonable steps to ensure that his entry with the owner was 
lawful by interviewing Ms. Gledhill before the entry to ascertain her ownership, 
relationship to the property and the occupants. 
(5) Ms. Gledhill specifically granted consent to the entry and search conducted by 
the Officers. 
(6) Once inside, from the lawful vantage point Officer Brimley occupied, the items he 
observed in plain view are admissible pursuant to that doctrine. 
(7) Further, the court specifically finds Mr. Jeremy Allen voluntarily granted consent 
to search the residence, and as the renter and occupant of the property, he had 
authority to grant consent to search the residence. 
(8) Joshua John Allen was not a resident, and his consent to search the residence was 
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not required. 
(y; Further, even if Joslma Johr1 Allen was a resident, the search of the residence was 
of common areas, for which Jeremy Alleii was empowered to, atid du! -_-raiit 
(10) The pat down of the person of Defendant which yielded two knives was lawful as 
a "Terry frisk," the court being satisfied that such was justified under the 
circumstances to ensure the Officer's safety because there were four male suspects 
and initially one, then two Officers; the proximity of the male suspects to possible 
weapons; ai id the Defei idai it's offerii ig of what 1:1 le Of ficer suspected was a false 
identity, heightening the Officer's concern. 
(11) I he Defendai it '\ • : h u itai ily consei tied to i e:t i, IC ;al of 1 ns ;vaX!et 1 1 lei efore, 
evidence of his true identity found therein is admissible. 
(12) I he Officer was empowered to arrest Defendant lor false personal information 
pursuant to §77-7-2(1) U.C.A., 1999, which allows arrest of suspects who commit 
crimes in the presence of the Officer. Therefore the arrest of Defendant was 
lawful. 
(13) The Court concludes the backpack was within the area of Defendant's immediate 
col ill :>1 coi: isidering Defendai it' s pi \y sical pi oxii i lit;; > to tl le backpack. the position 
of the Officer and the Defendant in relation to the area of the backpack, and the 
number of Officers (one) verses the number of suspects (four). 
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(14) The search of the backpack was contemporaneous with Defendant's lawful arrest. 
(15) As such, search of Defendant's backpack was lawful incident to his arrest, and 
evidence seized pursuant to that search admissible. 
(16) Finally, because the Court finds no illegal search occurred, Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Defendant's Statements based on alleged violations of the Fourth 
Amendment is Denied. 
(17) The Court finds it unnecessary to make any finding regarding whether Ms. 
Gledhill's actions were in violation of State Statutes on Forcible Entry and 
Detainer (§78-36-1 U.C.A., et. seq.) concluding that even if such violation 
occurred, the Statute does not provide a suppression remedy in this criminal 
context, but rather a civil remedy for those aggrieved. 
Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is Denied. 
Dated thisj^ft day of May, 2002. 
S* • 
Honorable Sheila KA McCIeve* ?* ^ ^ / $J 
Judge, Third Judicial district p ^ % \ 3 ^ / ^ 
cc: 
Colleen K. Coebergh 
Attorney for the State 
348 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Ralph Dellapiana 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ADDENDUM C 
OOUTH SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMEN. 
CONSENT TO SEARCH 
Case No: Oi'^'^Si^ 
Name: ^ V , ? j - K\V ~ T / U 1 R \ £ Date of Birth: / / ^j)\Z Vhone Number: . 3 0 ^ ' S0f9 
Address: H 3 < ^ ^ / Q O C > ^ City: ^jfr Cll^Cy State:/., y Z i p C o d e : ^ / / ' / ^ ) 
I have been requested by Officer •O/C* - ^ /<-, / Badge No. £.£. > 
(who has made proper identification as an authorized law enforcement officer) to give my consent 
to a search of property that is in my care, custody, and control. 
I knowingly and willingly give Officers of the South Salt Lake Police Department and any 
other assisting agencies my permission to conduct a complete and thorough search of the 
premise(s) and/or property specifically described below. I understand that I may only give 
permission to search property that is under my care, custody, or control. 
Location(s) to be searched: 
On the premise(s) of: L/5 co -2ix> 
/ l .y /hoyy- *?~yy f ^ o , c -SV UJ 













I understand this search extends to any and all items located in the above described areas, 
including but not limited to any opened, closed, and/or locked containers, trunks, hoods, 
compartments, or rooms. I further give officers permission to seize any property or things 
necessary for any criminal prosecution in this case or any other case under investigation. I have 
read and initialed the above described areas to be searched and I give permission for it to be 
searched voluntarily without any threat, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind having been 
made to induce me to give my consent. 
I UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REFUSE THIS SEARCH. 
«**,•' ////fliA ,•£&— ™*!Ht&L Sic 
Witness / K D ^ -' ' V ' - ^ y Date ) I - " / ^ / 
Witness Date 
1 s 
STATE'S 
EXHIBIT 
